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Abstract 
 
In principle, a careful evaluation of costs and benefits should be a wise rule for 
everyone who has to take any important decision. In particular, it is very important 
when a payment system reform is at stake. Since many stakeholders are involved in 
a payment system reform, the final decisions are going to be the result of several 
cost-benefit analyses and of “negotiation” among economic agents, in particular 
system providers, system participants, and end users. In this paper we will only 
focus on cost-benefit analysis, providing both theoretical guidelines and numerical 
examples. We conclude that past evaluations of payment system reforms mainly 
focused on qualitative assessments, hence overlooking quantitative ones. So, we 
suggest that it would be worthy for international institutions to spend some efforts 
to build, manage and make available to all countries a database on payments 
systems, with both relevant data and methods to assess costs and benefits. 
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1  Introduction 
 
In principle, a careful evaluation of costs and benefits should be a wise rule for 
everyone who has to take any important decision. In particular, it is very important 
when a payment system reform is at stake. A cost-benefit analysis might be 
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beneficial when dealing with many relevant issues: what options to choose for the 
short and for the long term, how to implement the selected options, what is the 
optimal timing, and so on.  
Since many stakeholders are involved in a payment system reform, the final 
decisions are going to be the result of several cost-benefit analyses and of 
“negotiation” among economic agents, in particular system providers, system 
participants, and end users. In this paper we will only focus on cost-benefit analysis 
(for a complete and simple introduction to cost-benefit analysis see [3], [4], [17] 
and [19]), since we dealt with “negotiation” in another recently published article 
(see [5]). 
All guidelines concerning payment systems explicitly refer to cost-benefit analysis 
as an indispensable tool for all agents, and in particular for central banks: 
 Core Principle VIII (see [7), states that, for systematically important 
payment systems, “the system should provide a means of making 
payments which is practical for its users and efficient for the 
economy”. 
 Recommendation 15 (see [8]) says that “while maintaining safe and 
secure operations, securities settlement systems should be cost 
effective in meeting the requirement of users”. 
 Public Policy Goal C for retail payments (see [9]) states that 
“policies relating to the efficiency and safety of retail payments 
should be designed, where appropriate, to support the development 
of effective standards and infrastructure arrangements”.   
 
In Section 2 we provide a primer in cost-benefit analysis with a focus on how such 
tool could be applied to problems concerning any payment system reform. Section 
3 provides an example of a cost-benefit analysis of a payment system reform, and 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2  A Primer in Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
 
CBA can be thought of as a procedure made of the following steps: 
 Assessing the decisions to be evaluated. 
 Identifying players and their utility function. 
 Assessing Payoffs. 
 Prioritizing. 
Notice that although such steps are generally valid and should guide any decision 
maker, they are particularly relevant for Central Banks and the National Payment 
Councils (if they exist), both of which must take into account the final effect of 
their policies on all relevant economic agents.   
In the following subsections we will discuss in detail each step. 
 
A Methodological Toolkit to Reform Payment Systems 
 
 
35 
2.1 Assessing the Decisions to Be Evaluated 
Such step is a pre-condition for a correct cost-benefit analysis. To assess the 
decision to be evaluated, problem structuring is the best tool. 
Problem structuring is the basic toolkit for consultants. It allows decision makers to 
analyze in depth what are the issues at stake (the so called “issue identification”) 
and what decision have to be taken (“decision structuring”). 
Issue identification consists not only in decomposing a problem into issues, but also 
in associating several sub-issues to any issue previously identified.  An example of 
issue identification in a payment system context is the National Payment Council 
strategic analysis of a country payment system (see Table 1). From Table 1, it 
clearly emerges how each sub-issue in our example should also be decomposed in 
other sub-sub-issues
4
. 
 
 
Table 1: National Payment Council - Issue identification 
 
 
 
Once issues are identified, decision structuring allows to identify the key decisions 
to be made (and evaluated), looking at the hierarchical order of such decisions. 
Some decisions are made irrelevant if other decisions (hierarchically antecedent) 
are taken. As an example, a person who decides to work as an employee and not to 
be self-employed does not have in turn to decide whether to be on her own or to 
work in partnership with other people, a decision that, if self-employed, she must 
take. 
                                                 
4
 On such topic also see the methodology for stocktaking used in the context of the Western 
Hemisphere Payments and Securities Clearance and Settlement Initiative. 
• Which are the available options? 
• What timing / Costs / Difficulty of implementation?
• Which objectives / Principles / Targets?
Issue Sub-Issue
• What could we have?
• What do we want?
• Which Infrastructures / Procedures / Legal situation?
• What organization / Role of the Central Bank/ Stakeholders 
involved?
• What do we have?
• How do we rank options? How do we prioritize? What’s the 
social welfare utility function?
• What should we have?
• What organization / Role of the Central Bank / Stakeholders to 
be involved?
• What funding?
• How do we manage the transition?
• How should we get to that?
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An example of decision structuring in a payment system context is described by the 
decision tree of a National Payment Council (see Table 2) which, once made a 
diagnostic of the current status of the national payment system, must decide among 
several options, for both the short term / the transition phase, and the long term. 
Notice that such decisions involve both different typology of payments (retail, 
securities, ..) and many other issues (how integrated the system should be, what 
standards of safety, ..). 
 
 
Table 2: National Payment Council - Decision structuring 
 
 
 
 
2.2  Identifying Players and Utility Functions 
Once the decisions to be evaluated are known, CBA starts with the identification of 
all involved stakeholders (so called “players”) and their utility functions. Typically, 
in a payment system reform, the set of stakeholders involved is very large (see [4]). 
Moreover, same stakeholders do not play the same roles in different countries; 
however, in the following list we classify stakeholders according to the main role 
that they most often play in payment systems, especially in industrialized countries: 
 Central Bank, Securities and Exchange Commission, Banking 
Supervision, National Payment Council, Antitrust Authorities: 
overseers
5
 of the system/ players / transactions; 
 Ministries of Finance, Legislative Authorities: regulators; 
 Clearinghouses, other payment service providers, the Stock 
Exchange, Central Security Depository: system providers; 
 Commercial banks, non-bank financial institutions, brokers/dealers: 
mostly system participants; 
                                                 
5
 Oversight, banks’ supervision, market surveillance. 
Retail Payments
Systematically 
Important PS
Foreign Exchange 
Settlement Systems
Securities 
Settlement Systems
Assessing options
•Recommendations 
CPSS (2001)
•Public Policy 
Goals CPSS (2003)
•Check CPSS 
•Core Principles 
CPSS (2001)
Diagnostic
What’s best for 
the system .. ?
Long term / 
Vision?
Short–term / 
transition? Option 
B
Option 
1
Option 
2
Option 
A
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 The Public Sector, e.g. Treasury: end user of the National Payment 
System;   
 Consumers and firms: end-users6. 
For each player, a utility (or objective) function has to be identified by defining the 
relevant arguments (i.e., what affects the utility of players), and the shape of such 
function (i.e., which arguments are more relevant in relative terms). Typically:  
 Central Banks care mostly about safety and efficiency of payments 
systems as a whole (see also [2], [7], [12]). Notice that while 
efficiency evaluations are about expected outcomes, safety 
considerations imply second-order considerations, that is 
(stochastic) considerations about standard deviation of outcomes. 
 Other public institutions also care about safety and efficiency, 
though dedicated Authorities are focused on specific public issues 
(for example, antitrust authorities are obviously focused on antitrust, 
others on crime prevention or consumer protection, and so on). 
Securities commissions focus on the development of capital markets 
(which could potentially conflict with safety, if development implies 
more trading and less risk control). 
 System providers - both public and private - care also about safety, 
overall efficiency, and own profitability. Obviously, private system 
providers care about own profitability more than public ones. 
 Financial institutions focus on profits (efficiency). However, large 
banks are aware of their “public role” of maintaining the orderly 
functioning of the payment system, and therefore care about safety 
as well. 
 The public sector cares about overall efficiency and safety, though 
balancing any automation with existing bureaucracy (and, therefore, 
existing safety standards) and political stability (since automation 
can result in job losses and, therefore, political instability). 
 As for end users, firms typically care about profits, while consumers 
are mainly concerned about leisure and consumption. Hence, they 
care about safety of their transactions. 
Notice that in a payment system reform two relevant issues for both safety and 
efficiency are the following: 
 Timing. It is relevant both for the transition period (how long is it 
going to last?) and for the long term (for how long are the benefits 
going to last?).  
 Difficulty of implementation, again relevant both for the transition 
and for the long term.  
                                                 
6
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public institutions, and mediate conflicts among banks. 
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To evaluate the last two issues, stochastic considerations can be appropriate, 
implying evaluations of standard deviations of outcomes. 
Finding the shape of utility / objective functions of involved stakeholders poses 
several interesting theoretical problems, among which how to relatively weigh the 
identified arguments: for public stakeholders, for example central banks, the 
problem of weighting arises even when only efficiency is considered, since 
households’ savings, firms’, system participants’ and system providers’ profits 
might be differently weighted. 
To derive relative weights, several techniques can be used:  
 Surveying relevant stakeholders over the weight they would 
themselves apply; 
 Running focus groups to compare different combinations of 
arguments (for example grouping central bank officers); 
 Estimating weights by means of econometric procedures based on 
past observations (see [3]). 
 
2.3  Assessing Payoffs 
This step can be split into two sub-steps: 
 Assessing costs and benefits (see Section 2.3.1.). 
 Aggregating values over time (see Section 2.3.2.). 
 
2.3.1  Assessing Costs and Benefits  
Costs and benefits of players must be measured according to the arguments 
included in their utility functions. As an example, measuring costs and benefits of a 
project for central banks implies estimating not only final outcomes (that is, 
efficiency), but also the volatility of such outcomes (that is, safety). 
Arguments need to be assessed in terms of actual costs and revenues of 
stakeholders. So, arguments need to be decomposed into unit prices and quantities 
of inputs and outputs. Both unit prices and quantities can be either endogenous 
(strategy or shadow values) or exogenous (given parameters), as it will be clarified 
in Section 2.4 and 3 below. 
As for prices, if markets are competitive (or market imperfections are negligible), 
market or rental prices of inputs / outputs should be used. Otherwise, shadow 
pricing is the most appropriate technique; in particular, when goods are traded (on 
international markets), world prices can be used; when goods are non-traded, prices 
can be obtained through: 
 Surveying consumers; 
 Cross-country or cross-industry benchmarking; 
 Solving agents’ utility maximization problems (see [4]).  
As for quantities of inputs and outputs, either it is possible to detect them from 
benchmarking (for example, to access the new payment system each participant 
needs a certain number of stations and workers each month) or they come as an 
outcome of some utility maximization problem. 
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Besides prices and quantities, other factors play a crucial role in assessing costs and 
benefits of a payment systems reform; in particular: 
 The assessment over the stochastic distribution of outcomes - as 
mentioned above - plays a central role in estimating the risks of any 
payment system (for a Central Bank the evaluation of the systemic 
risk is especially important). Such assessment can be done through 
either an estimation (for which data are needed), or through 
benchmarking. 
 The externality effect of having a national infrastructure for 
payments when trading volumes are low (especially in small 
economies). In order to evaluate externalities, a careful 
identification of all relevant parameters must be done through 
estimation (for which data are needed) or benchmarking. 
As for the latter point, the three main parameters to take into consideration in a 
payment systems reform are the following: 
 Quantity of transactions: a low quantity of transactions usually 
makes system providers and / or participants unprofitable. There is a 
critical mass of transactions (see [11]) that makes a payment system 
effective and profitable for both system participants and system 
providers. 
 Price of transactions to participants: together with the quantity of 
transactions and the cost structure of system providers, it defines the 
business value of the payment system for the system provider. 
 Price of transactions to end-users: given the previous parameters, it 
defines the number of profitable sustainable participants, given their 
costs (personnel, G&A, ..). 
 
2.3.2  Aggregating Values over Time 
In adding up values over time the choice of both a proper discount rate and an 
appropriate aggregating technique deserves special attention. 
 
Discount Rate 
The discount rate is the rate through which future outcomes are compared with 
current ones. It is the relative price of tomorrow’s consumption versus today’s. It 
can be thought of as an opportunity cost for savers and investors: in fact, investors 
willing to undertake an investment take into consideration the opportunity cost of 
forgoing alternative investments; at the same time, savers decide the amount of 
savings on the basis of the opportunity cost of consuming tomorrow instead of 
today. If markets are imperfect, investors and savers have different discount rates; 
moreover, private discount rates do not include the effects of current investments 
on future cohorts, hence differing from the social discount rate. 
As for payment systems, private agents (system providers, participants, and all 
consumers and firms) should adopt the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to 
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measure the discount rate if they act as investors. Such discount rate is defined by 
the following formula: 
 
CAPM= RF +  (RM - RF ) 
 
where RF is the risk free rate, RM the market return, and  the systematic risk of 
equities. 
 
Central banks, instead, should act as social planners, taking into account social 
effects. The Social Time Preference Rate (STPR) is defined by the following 
formula: 
 
STPR= r + g 
 
where r is the pure rate of time preference, g is the expected growth rate of per 
capita consumption, and  is the negative elasticity of marginal utility with respect 
to consumption.  
The social discount rate weighs CAPM and STPRaccording to the nature of the 
payment system project: if the system induces negligible social externalities, a 
discount rate closer to CAPM is more appropriate; if the system causes a high social 
impact, a discount rate closer to STPR should be chosen. Notice that STPR is usually 
lower than CAPM. A reasonable rule of thumb is to set a lower bound to the social 
discount rate at the risk free rate. 
Both discount rates induce computational difficulties, especially in countries where 
data are hard to retrieve. In the following list, we provide simple advices on how to 
compute discount rates in case data are lacking: 
 RF: if such rate is not available in the selected country, make use of 
the interest rate on government debt, traded on foreign markets; 
 RM and if no countrywide benchmarking is available, use S&P 
500 as a benchmark; 
 r: use low values (from 0% to 5%) to acknowledge that government 
cares about future generations; 
 g: historically it might turn out to be negative; in such case use own 
estimates (even if judgemental); 
  micro data are needed to estimate it; if data are not available, try 
appropriate benchmarks.  
 
Aggregating Technique 
Net Present Value (NPV) is the most commonly used aggregating technique. It 
implies adding all future streams of costs and benefits, discounted at a proper 
discount rate .   
NPV computations are very sensitive to changes of the discount rate, whose 
evaluation is therefore crucial: the lower , the higher the NPV. If projects should 
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be ranked only on the basis of their NPV, only projects with positive NPV should 
be undertaken, and among these, the higher the NPV, the better.  
Another way of ranking projects is to compute the internal rate of return of the 
project (IRR), or the rate of return (, that makes the NPV equal to 0, and to 
compare it with the actual discount rate . If < , the project can be undertaken. 
The main problem with such ranking criterion is that there is room for multiplicity 
of  
Firms usually evaluate projects only in terms of their money value, making use of 
the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) concept, which is nothing else than an NPV, 
where in each period cash balance is the value to be discounted. 
 
2.4  Prioritization 
Given the previous steps, the full scenario should be clear at this point (decisions, 
players, utility functions, payoffs); therefore, the analytical setup of the 
prioritization problem is straightforward. 
Players have to pick the best strategy amongst all available ones in order to 
maximize their objective / utility functions under a set of constraints, either 
monetary or else (timing, politics, etc.). The prioritization problem can range from 
trivial (choose project A or B) to cumbersome, as shown in the example of Section 
3 below.  
The solution of each player’s maximization problem is a partial equilibrium 
outcome of the cost-benefit analysis.  
When more agents are involved, it is more realistic to assume that each player’s 
strategy affects other players’ payoffs: if such an assumption holds, a game must be 
setup, and a solution to the game has to be found through game theoretical analysis, 
an approach that goes beyond the scope of this paper (see [5]). 
 
 
3  Example7 
 
In our ad hoc economy, there is only one very simple national payment system (the 
current NPS), where the following players interact: 
 A Central Bank, which operates as the overseer, the regulator, the 
investor (that is, it provides funds to build up the payment system), 
and the unique system provider. We assume that it bears only costs 
related to system provision. 
 The Financial Institutions, which are the system participants. We 
assume that there are 50 participants. To simplify things, there is no 
Antitrust Authority, and they collude on the fees they set to 
consumers. 
                                                 
7
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 The Consumers, which are the only end-users. We assume there are 
10 millions consumers. 
If a technological shock occurs. a decision should be taken on whether to upgrade 
the whole NPS or not. If the NPS is upgraded, all participants must adopt the new 
technology when the Big Bang occurs: an upgrade implies a technological 
investment both for the system provider and for the system participants; moreover, 
a new fee system has to be implemented (i.e., new fees to participants and end-
users). Hence, each agent must assess its own convenience to upgrade to the new 
NPS; in particular, this is a crucial decision for the Central Bank, that in many 
cases acts as a social planner.  
We assume that both the system participants and the system provider run their 
operations bearing both (semi) fixed (personnel, G&A, other) and variable costs, 
that depend on the number of transactions intermediated. Fees are proportional: 
they depend on the yearly number of transactions, that are assumed to be 120 per 
capita.  
As said, the upgrade requires relevant setup costs both for the system provider and 
for each participant. If setup costs are sustained at year t, the Big Bang is assumed 
to happen in t+3. 
The effects of the upgrade are assumed to be the following: 
 For consumers, each transaction will require 1 minute of time 
instead of 5 minutes (as in the current system). 
 Fixed costs for participants will be halved, while they will be 
reduced by 25% for the system provider. 
 Variable costs for the system provider will be halved. 
 Investments required for the upgrade are € 1.5 millions for each 
system participant and € 20 millions for the system provider.  
 The upgrade is assumed not to affect safety of the NPS. 
Also, we assume that the upgrade has no effects (or negligible ones) on both the 
velocity of circulation of money and on the overall level consumption. This is to 
make our results as robust as possible in case the upgrade is found to be 
convenient.  
Starting from the above assumptions, we can apply the methodology described in 
Section 2 as follows: 
1. Decisions to be taken: for the Central Bank and the participants, the key 
problem is to choose whether to upgrade the system or not. 
2. Players and Utility functions: 
­ The Central Bank social welfare function is a weighted average of 
the utility functions of consumers and participants. Moreover, the 
Central Bank is constrained to keep a nonnegative DCF. 
­ Utility functions of financial institutions (that is, system 
participants) coincide with their DCF. 
­ Utility functions of consumers have two arguments: leisure and 
consumption. 
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3. Payoffs: given cost and revenue functions, it is possible to derive costs 
and benefits for all participants, given any fee system of the new NPS.  
4. Prioritization: 
­ Central Bank: 
∙ It has to pick a fee system for the upgraded NPS in order to 
maximize its own utility function. Optimal outcome must be 
such that aggregate utility of consumers is increased over 
current NPS and DCF of participants is nonnegative. 
∙ In Figure 1 we provide a utility possibility frontier (UPF) for 
the Central Bank: on the axes, the overall increase of utility 
with respect to the current NPS for both consumers (UC) 
and participants (UP) are represented. The origin of the axes 
is the locus where both participants and consumers are 
indifferent with respect to the current NPS. 
∙ Each point on the UPF is associated with a fee system (a pair 
of values of fees charged to participants and to end-users). 
For any fee system, the DCF for the system provider (i.e., the 
Central Bank) is zero. 
∙ Given the indifference curves of the Central Bank, the 
optimal fee system is the one leading to point A on the UPF, 
as shown in Figure 1. On point A the increase of DCF of 
system participants (that is, financial institutions) is close to 
zero. 
∙ The main outcomes are:8 
a) The system must be upgraded. 
b) Fees to participants and consumers are reduced by 
43% and 18% respectively. 
c) While transactions per consumer increase by 12%, 
total costs per consumer decrease by 7%, and total 
time spent is reduced by 77%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 It is assumed that system participants will join the upgrade even if they are indifferent. 
Calculations are straightforward, but they can be asked to authors anytime. 
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Figure 1: Maximization of system provider’s utility 
 
 
­ Participants: 
∙ Their problem is to set fees to charge to end-users in the new 
NPS, in order to maximize their DCF (given the fees charged 
by the system provider). 
∙ Participants would pick point P on the UPF of Figure 1, 
being constrained not to decrease utility of consumers. 
Notice that the outcomes described above differ one from the other. To find an 
equilibrium for the system a game should be setup (see [5]). 
 
 
4   Final Comments 
 
To run an analysis such as the one presented in the above example, the following 
general problems might arise: 
 Tractability: 
­ Problem: the complexity of the issue might be such that a 
formal representation cannot be performed accurately in a 
reasonable amount of time, or given a time constraint. 
­ Advice: keep the problem as simple as possible, using an 
80/20 approach (solve 80% of the problem by treating the 
20% most important issues).  
 Data availability:  
UCB2
DUC
DUP
UCB1
P
UPF
A
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­ Problem: data are not always available, especially in less 
developed countries, or at least not in a reasonable amount of 
time or given a time constraint. 
­ When some issues cannot be numerically estimated: 
a) Make judgemental evaluations using qualitative 
assessments (for example a scale of three levels: 
bad, good, very good); 
b) Give numerical values to the qualitative 
assessments; 
c) Weigh the assessments using revealed preferences 
or through judgemental considerations. 
 
By following the above advices, a useful CBA for payments systems reforms can 
always be run, to prioritize among options. The operators that could use it more 
profitably are either the National Payment Council or the Central Bank. The 
situations where they could apply CBA are so many, starting from the example in 
Section 3, that it would be hard to quote one in particular. 
Even by looking at the approaches used in the past to evaluate payment system 
reforms - looking carefully at all qualitative elements, but perhaps not considering 
in depth any numerical assessment -it seems that it would be worthy for the 
international institutions to spend some efforts to build, manage and make available 
to all countries a database on payments systems, with both relevant data throughout 
the world and methods of assessing costs and benefits. 
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